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lations Board, there are a number of significant areas in which 
state courts may exercise jurisdiction; during 1969, California 
courts had opportunity to determine a variety of issues raising 
fundamental conflicts of position: The State Supreme Court 
was called on to decide a case of classic tension between con-
stitutional rights of free speech and private property/ and the 
Courts of Appeal passed on the issue of employees' basic right 
to organize,2 a claim of duress by an employer who contended 
he was "forced" to sign a collective bargaining agreement,3 
and competing contentions with respect to the arbitrability of 
certain disputes. 4 It was familiar territory for labor law, but 
some new guidelines were posted. 
II. Free Speech and Private Property 
"The carrying of signs and banners, no less than the raising 
of a flag, is a natural and appropriate means of conveying in-
formation on matters of public concern.,,5 Thus, dissemina-
tion of information through picketing or handbilling has long 
been considered a form of speech protected by the First 
Amendment. 6 Picketing, because it is viewed in the context 
of a labor dispute as "something more" than speech, is subject 
to regulation with respect to the lawfulness of the objective 
sought or the particular means used,7 but picketing for a lawful 
purpose and in a lawful manner cannot constitutionally be 
enjoined.s 
In recent years, courts have been called on to decide in 
a number of cases whether and under what circumstances 
1. In re Lane, 71 Cal.2d -, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 729, 457 P.2d 561 (1969). For 
further discussion of this case, see 
Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, in this 
volume. 
2. Wetherton v. Growers Farm La-
bor Association, 275 Cal. App.2d -, 
79 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1969). 
3. Sabella v. Litchfield, 274 Cal. App. 
2d -,78 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1969). 
4. Leon Handbag Co. v. Local 213, 
276 Cal. App.2d -,81 Cal. Rptr. 63 
(1969). 
512 
5. Carlson v. State of California, 
310 U.S. 106, 113, 84 L.Ed. 1104, 1108, 
60 S.Ct. 746, - (1940). 
6. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 
88, 84 L.Ed. 1093, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940). 
7. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice 
Co., 336 U.S. 490, 93 L.Ed. 834, 69 
S.Ct. 684 (1949). 
8. International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Local 695, A.F.L., v. Vogt, 
Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 1 L.Ed.2d 1347, 77 
S.Ct. 1166 (1957). 
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picketing or handbilling may be subject to an injunction be-
cause the conduct takes place on privately owned property that 
is generally open to public use. Many of the cases have in-
volved shopping centers, and, in 1968, the United States Su-
preme Court held in Amalgamated Food Employees Union, 
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza9 that a state court could not 
constitutionally enjoin union picketing in front of a store in 
a shopping center, even though the shopping center, including 
the property involved, was privately owned. Relying on 
Marsh v. Alabama/o which involved a company town and 
which held that "the more an owner, for his advantage, opens 
up his property for use by the public in general, the more do 
his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and con-
stitutional rights of those who use it,,,ll the Court in Logan 
Valley Plaza reasoned that the shopping center mall 
". . . is the funtional equivalent of a business block, 
and for First Amendment purposes must be treated in 
substantially the same manner.,,12 
Were the rule otherwise, the Court observed, downtown busi-
nesses would be subject to on-the-spot public criticism for their 
practices, but businesses in the suburbs "could largely im-
munize themselves from similar criticism by creating a 'cordon 
sanitaire' of parking lots around their store."13 
In 1969 in In re Lane/4 the California Supreme Court by 
unanimous decision applied the Logan Valley Plaza doctrine 
to protect union handbilling on a privately owned sidewalk in 
front of a single grocery store that was not part of any shop-
ping center. The sidewalk in Lane bordered the front of the 
store and was used as access to and from a parking area ex-
tending approximately 150 feet to the nearest public street and 
sidewalk. Recognizing that handbilling on this distant public 
sidewalk would be an impractical means of reaching store cus-
9. 391 U.S. 308, 20 L.Ed.2d 603, 88 12. 391 U.S. 308, 20 L.Ed.2d 603, 
S.Ct. 1601 (1968). -, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 1612. 
10. 326 U.S. 501, 90 L.Ed. 265, 66 13. 391 U.S. 308, -, 20 L.Ed.2d 
S.Ct. 276 (1946). 603, -,88 S.Ct. 1601, 1612. 
11. 326 U.S. 501, -, 90 L.Ed. 265, 14. 71 Cal.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729, 
-, 66 S.Ct. 276, 278. 457 P.2d 501 (1969). 
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tomers, who typically used the parking lot and private side-
walk, the Court reasoned that a ruling of the private sidewalk 
to be "off limits" for the exercise of First Amendment rights 
would permit the store to immunize itself by the kind of "cor-
don sanitaire" against which Logan Valley Plaza warned.15 
Thus, in upholding the right to distribute the handbills in In 
re Lane, the Court characterized Logan Valley Plaza as hold-
ing: 
" that when a business establishment invites the 
public generally to patronize its stores and in doing so to 
traverse a sidewalk opened for access by the public, the 
fact of private ownership of the sidewalk does not operate 
to strip the members of the public of their rights to ex-
ercise First Amendment privileges on the sidewalk at or 
near the place of entry to the establishment. Hl6 
III. Protection of the Right To Organize 
Normally, protection of the right of individual employees 
to join or participate in the activities of labor organizations is 
a matter of federal law, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the National Labor Relations Board.17 But there are excep-
tions to this general rule, and one of them exists where the 
employment relationship is expressly excluded from coverage 
under the federal statute. Because agricultural labor falls 
into this category,18 a California court, in Wetherton v. Grow-
ers Farm Labor Association/9 had an opportunity to consider 
the scope of protection afforded agricultural labor by Califor-
nia law. 
The plaintiffs in Wetherton had been employed by a carrot 
producer in the Salinas Valley, and asserted that they had been 
15. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
729, 732, 457 P.2d 561, 564. 
16. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
729, 733, 457 P.2d 561, 565. 
17. Compare San Diego Building 
Trades Council Etc. v. Garmon, 359 
U.S. 236, 34 L.Ed.2d 775, 79 S.Ct. 773 
(1959). 
514 
18. Section 152(3) of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 USC §§ 141 
et seq., excludes "any individual em-
ployed as an agricultural laborer" from 
one statutory definition of "employee." 
19. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 543 (1969). 
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discharged because they joined the United Farm Workers 
Organizing Committee. In addition to the employer, two em-
ployer associations and their representatives were named as 
defendants. The action was based on section 922, of the La-
bor Code,20 which prohibits "yellow dog" contracts (requir-
ing, as a condition of employment, that the employee agree 
not to join a labor organization) and on section 923,1 which 
declares it to be the public policy of the state that workers 
"shall be free from the interference, restraint or coercion of 
employers" with respect to self-organization, designation of 
representatives, and concerted activities. The action was set-
tled as between plaintiffs and their former employer, but the 
action was continued against the defendant employer associa-
tions on the theories that they constituted joint employers 
and that they were participants in a conspiracy to commit 
the wrongful act of firing. Affidavits indicated that one of 
the respondents, the vice-president of both employer associa-
tions, did participate actively in the decision to fire the plain-
tiffs, but the Superior Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of defendants on both causes of action, and plaintiffs 
appealed. 
20. Labor Code § 922 (Coercion Not 
To Join Labor Organization Misde-
meanor) read: 
"Any person or agent or officer there-
of who coerces or compels any person 
to enter into an agreement, written or 
verbal, not to join or become a member 
of any labor organization, as condition 
of securing employment or continuing 
in the employment of any such person 
is guilty of a misdemeanor." 
1. Labor Code § 923 reads: 
Declaration of Public Policy. 
"In the interpretation and application 
of this chapter, the public policy of 
this state is declared as follows: 
"Negotiation of terms and conditions 
of labor should result from voluntary 
agreement between employer and em-
ployees. Governmental authority has 
permitted and encouraged employers to 
CAl.l.AW 1970 
organize in the corporate and other 
forms of capital control. In dealing 
with such employers, the individual un-
organized worker is helpless to exercise 
actual liberty of contract and to protect 
his freedom of labor and thereby to ob-
tain acceptable terms and conditions of 
employment. Therefore it is necessary 
that the individual workman have full 
freedom of association, self-organiza-
tion, and designation of representatives 
of his own choosing, to negotiate the 
terms and conditions of his employ-
ment, and that he shall be free from the 
interference, restraint, or coercion of 
employers of labor, or their agents, in 
the designation of such representatives 
or in self-organization or in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of col-
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The Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment with 
respect to the joint employer theory; but it reversed with re-
spect to the conspiracy theory, because it found a triable issue 
of fact. With respect to the conspiracy question, the Court 
concluded that the affidavits indicated that the vice-president 
of the employer associations had met with and advised the em-
ployer concerning the discharge of plaintiffs, and had pro-
posed to blacklist them with other employers, and that if this 
could be established at trial the plaintiffs should prevail. The 
Court also stated, in accord with a prior appellate decision,2 
that section 932, established a basis for damages as well as 
injunctive relief in the event of discharge for union activities. 
In so doing, the Court significantly extended the protection 
accorded labor under California law, for it rejected the argu-
ments urged by defendants that section 922, provides only a 
criminal penalty for violation and that section 923, is merely 
an expression of public policy. 
IV. Collective Bargaining Agreements 
In the formative period of labor law, when the legal status 
of collective bargaining agreements was still much in doubt, 
employers frequently defended enforcement actions by assert-
ing that the agreement was the product of duress, i.e., the re-
sult of threatened economic action by the union. But courts 
rejected this defense on the ground that economic action is 
inherent in the collective bargaining process.3 Indeed, one 
historian of labor law asserts flatly that "there is no reported 
case of a collective bargaining agreement held void for du-
ress."4 If that generalization requires some qualification with 
respect to agreements signed under the threat of illegal strikes 
or picketing,5 it appears at least to be accurate in the case of 
2. Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock 
Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App.2d 793, 13 Cal. 
Rptr. 769 (1961). 
3. E.g., Wasserstein v. Beim, 294 
NYS 439 (Sup. Ct. 1937). See Annota-
tion, 145 A.L.R. 1171. 
4. Teller, Labor Disputes and Collec-
tive Bargaining § 161 (1940). 
516 
5. Compare Lafayette Dramatic Pro-
ductions v. Ferentz, 305 Mich. 193, 9 
N.W.2d 57 (1943). (Strike threat to 
compel hiring of unwanted musicians, 
deemed unlawful under state law.) 
See Annotation, 145 A.L.R. 1171. 
CAL LAW 1970 6
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 18
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/18
Labor Relations 
economic action that is otherwise lawful. There have been 
no reported cases invalidating a collective bargaining agree-
ment for duress in the last 20 years. 
It is, therefore, rather surprising to find the defense raised 
at the appellate level in 1969, in the context of lawful union 
activity, and even more surprising to find the Court according 
it some recognition by way of dicta although rejecting its ap-
plication to the facts of the case in question. In Sabella v. 
Litchfield,s trustees of a union's health and welfare fund 
brought suit for collection of contributions due from an em-
ployer, a restaurant owner, pursuant to a collective bargaining 
agreement that the latter had signed. The employer's defense 
was that the agreement had been signed because of a threat 
that a union representative would picket the restaurant on the 
night on which a dinner was to be given in honor of the local 
sheriff and that the dinner would have been cancelled if the 
agreement had not been signed. The employer claimed he 
had had no time to read the agreement and that he was not 
aware of the provision requiring trust fund contributions. 
These facts, the defendant-employer argued, constituted du-
ress and undue influence. The trial court gave judgment for 
the plaintiff on a directed verdict, and defendant ap-
pealed. 
The reviewing Court, observing that the union had a legal 
right to picket and that a threat to exercise that right could not 
constitute duress, affirmed the judgment. It is of some inter-
est, however, that the Court opined that its decision might 
have been different if the union had made a "sudden demand, 
utterly surprising in its terms," that might "cause an employer 
to be so distraught that he would be unable to make a real 
decision, but would yield his signature under emotional 
stress;"7 however, the Court continued, because the employer 
had a running dispute with the union, because the contract 
that he signed was the standard agreement for the industry, 
and because he failed to protest the trust fund provisions until 
suit was brought, such a defense was not available. The 
6. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 7. 274 Cal. App.2d -, -, 78 Cal. 
845 (1969). Rptr. 845, 846. 
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Court cited no authority for its dicta and probably could not 
have done so. 
v. Arbitration 
Federal labor law strongly favors arbitration as a means of 
resolving labor disputes, and the teaching of the United States 
Supreme Court is that an order to arbitrate a grievance is not 
to be denied "unless it may be said with positive assurance that 
the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation 
that covers the asserted dispute.,,8 State courts are bound by 
the same principle in suits for violation of contracts between 
an employer and a labor organization that represents em-
ployees in an industry "affecting commerce," as defined in the 
federal act;9 even with respect to "intra-state" contractual re-
lationships California law is in accord.lO 
In Leon Handbag Co. v. Local 213,11 the employer, a hand-
bag manufacturer, notified the union representing its em-
ployees that because of changes in the industry, it intended 
to cease manufacturing and to engage in the jobbing of hand-
bags, which it would either import from other countries or 
arrange to have made through independent contractors. The 
union immediately objected that the proposed action would 
violate the collective bargaining agreement, which prohibited 
"outside contracting" except "in extreme emergencies and only 
after consultation with the union. "12 The employer brought 
suit in state court for declaratory judgment in support of its 
"right" to change its business from manufacturing to jobbing 
as announced. 
The union demurred to the employer's complaint on the 
ground that the agreement contained a broad grievance and 
8. United Steelworkers v. Warrior 
and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
582, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409, 1417, 80 S.Ct. 
1347, -. 
9. E.g., Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen & Helpers v. Lucas Flour 
Co., 369 U.S. 95, 7 L.Ed.2d 593, 82 S. 
Ct. 571 (1962). 
518 
10. Posner v. Grunwald-Marx Inc., 
56 C2d 169, 14 Cal. Rptr. 297, 363 P. 
2d 313 (1961). 
11. 276 Cal. App.2d -, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 63 (1969). 
12. 276 Cal. App.2d -, -, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 63, 64. 
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arbitration clause that called for arbitration of "any grievance, 
difference or dispute which arises concerning working condi-
tions or interpretations or application of this agreement.,,13 
The trial court sustained the demurrer. On appeal, the em-
ployer conceded that federal law was controlling and that the 
proposed contracting arrangement would be subject to the 
arbitration clause, but it contended that the demurrer was 
improperly sustained because its "absolute right to cease and 
terminate its business"14 was not subject to arbitration. In this 
connection, the employer relied on federal precedent to the 
effect that complete cessation of business cannot be held an 
unfair labor practice, even if motivated by antiunion con-
siderations.15 
The reviewing Court rejected the employer's argument and 
upheld the judgment on the demurrer. It was clear from the 
face of the complaint, the Court held, that the employer was 
not terminating its business, but rather changing its manner 
of operation, and, on the basis of the broad arbitration clause 
together with a sweeping "no-strike" obligation on the part of 
the union, "it cannot be said that the arbitration provisions 
do not cover the asserted dispute.,,16 
While Leon Handbag represented the usual situation in 
which the issue is whether a particular dispute should be de-
cided by the court or by an arbitrator, the situation was more 
complicated in San Diego etc. Carpenters v. Wood, Wire, etc. 
Union,17 where the collective bargaining agreement established 
two types of arbitral procedures and the question was which 
type was applicable to a particular dispute. An agreement 
between the employer, a construction contractor, and the 
Lathers Union contained a general arbitration clause provid-
ing for disputes to be submitted to an arbitration board, which 
was described in the agreement as a Joint Committee. It also 
13. 276 Cal. App.2d -, -,81 Cal. 
Rptr. 63, 64. 
14. 276 Cal. App.2d -, -, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 63, 64. 
15. Textile Workers Union v. Dar-
lington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 13 L. 
Ed.2d 827, 85 S.Ct. 994 (1964). 
CAL LAW 1970 
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Rptr. 63, 65. 
17. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. 
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contained a specific clause relating to "jurisdictional disputes," 
which were to be determined not by the Joint Committee, but 
by the National Joint Board for the Settlement of Jurisdic-
tional Disputes, which had been established by the Building 
Trades Department of the AFL-CIO. A dispute arose as to 
whether the employer was in violation of the agreement by 
assigning certain work, concerning the installation of panels 
of plaster base material, to employees represented by the car-
penters union rather than to employees represented by the 
lathers union. The lathers union claimed such work was 
covered by its agreement, but the carpenters union also 
claimed the work under its agreement with the same em-
ployer. 
The lathers union, rather than submit the dispute to the 
National Joint Board, chose instead to submit it to the Joint 
Committee (established under its own agreement). That 
committee decided against the employer and levied a fine of 
$400, but the Superior Court, on petition by the employer and 
the carpenters union, set aside the award and the reviewing 
Court affirmed. Since the issue was not whether the dispute 
should be arbitrated but which tribunal should arbitrate it, the 
Court reasoned that the national policy favoring arbitration 
did not preclude a decision vacating the award, and it was for 
the Court to decide which of the two procedures was applica-
ble. The lathers union argued that the dispute was not "juris-
dictional," but the product of unilateral action on the part of 
the employer, and that even if it were "jurisdictional," the 
agreement did not preclude the Joint Committee from ruling 
on it. The Court rejected both of these arguments in favor 
of resolution of the dispute by the National Joint Board. 
Weighing heavily in the Court's evaluation of the situation 
was the fact that two unions were involved, each asserting 
rights under its own agreement. Relying on federal precedent 
to the effect that a collective bargaining agreement is not an 
ordinary contract governed by common-law principles, and 
that in order to interpret such an agreement, "it is necessary 
to consider the scope of other related collective bargaining 
agreements, as well as the practice, usage, and custom pertain-
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ing to all such agreements,"18 the Court observed that arbitra-
tion under each union's separate agreement "would not finally 
settle the dispute between all of the parties interested because 
of the probability of divergent results."19 The National Joint 
Board procedure, by contrast, provided a procedure that was 
intended to be binding upon all parties. 
VI. Conclusion 
The court's concern with the probability of divergent results 
if each union were to proceed under its own agreement, points 
to difficult legal questions: What if the lathers union agree-
ment had not contained special provisions for resolution of 
work assignment disputes? Would the award of the Joint 
Committee under the lathers union agreement have been 
enforced under those circumstances? What about the inter-
ests of the carpenters union, which did not participate in the 
Joint Committee proceedings, or the interests of the employer, 
faced potentially with conflicting awards, each exposing him 
to further liability if he conforms to the other? The questions 
are of enormous practical significance, both because the 
survival of the National Joint Board is at present in serious 
doubt, and because many work assignment disputes arise 
among parties who are not subject to the National Joint Board 
procedure. 
There are two basic views of the situation. One is that 
arbitration is a purely contractual institution, with which the 
courts may not interfere. The arbitrator's jurisdiction is based 
exclusively on the collective bargaining agreement between 
the employer and (typically) a single union. If the agree-
ment provides for arbitration of a dispute as to whether par-
ticular work is to be assigned to members of the bargaining 
unit represented by that union, then the arbitrator is to decide 
the dispute based solely on the terms of that agreement. Un-
less the agreement so provides or all parties are willing, he may 
not permit the intervention of a second union in the proceed-
18. 274 Cal. App.2d -, -, 79 Cal. 19. 274 Cal. App.2d -, -, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 164, 167. Rptr 164, 167. 
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ing, nor may he decide the dispute on the basis of some other 
union's agreement. If the result, in a situation in which two 
unions each claim the same work, is that two arbitrations 
are conducted, and the arbitrators come up with conflicting 
awards, this is the employer's problem; he may have to pay 
damages to one union or the other, but this is the price he must 
pay for having entered into two agreements covering the same 
work. This view is supported to some extent by the U.S. Su-
preme Court's decision in Carey v. Westinghouse Electric 
Corp.,20 which the court in the San Die~o case (properly) dis-
tinguished as not involving any provision for joint arbitration 
procedure. 
The other view, represented by a recent decision of the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Ciruit, l is that ordinary prin-
ciples of contract are not applicable to collective bargaining 
agreements or to labor arbitration, and that it is both permis-
sible and desirable, at least in certain cases, for a court to 
order tripartite arbitration where two unions and two agree-
ments are involved. In that case, an employer faced with con-
flicting demands in a work assignment suit and a pending 
arbitration with only one of the two unions, brought suit in 
federal district court to enjoin the pending arbitration and to 
compel a tripartite joint arbitration with both unions included. 
Both agreements contained broad arbitration provisions, and 
the second union was willing to accept the arbitrator selected 
by the first. The federal district court granted the employer's 
request, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the 
district court had power to order a joint arbitration and that, 
under the circumstances, the power was not abused. The 
Court did not speculate as to what would be the proper result 
in a situation in which the two unions disagreed as to the 
selection of an arbitrator or arbitration panel. Conceivably, 
the Court could seek to persuade the parties to agree to tri-
partite arbitration by enjoining any arbitration proceedings 
unless agreement was reached, but that would be particularly 
20. 375 U.S. 261, 11 L.Ed.2d 320, Inc. v. American Recording and Broad-
84 S.Ct. 401 (1964). casting Association, 414 F.2d 1326 
1. Columbia Broadcasting System, (1969). 
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awkward in a case like the San Diego case, in which each 
union's contract specified an established arbitration board. 
The issue is on the brink between private contract and judicial 
creativity, and the cases could fall either way. 
* 
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